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Article 3

EMPIRICAL RESEARCH AND CIVIL JURY REFORM
Valerie P. Hans*
Stephanie Albertsont
INTRODUCTION

In January 2003, President George W. Bush invoked the supposed
failings of the civil jury as the rationale for sweeping changes to the
civil justice system.I In a speech given at the University of Scranton, in
Pennsylvania, a state where skyrocketing costs of medical malpractice
insurance had created a political crisis, President Bush said, "Excessive
jury awards will continue to drive up insurance costs, will put good
doctors out of Scranton, Pa." 2 Among the changes he proposed were
a decrease in the time that patients would have to sue their doctors, a
national cap on pain and suffering awards at $250,000, and a limit on
punitive damages."
Mr. Bush's speech was only the most recent in a long line of attacks on the functioning of the American civiljury. We can trace the
contemporary series of denunciations to the 1980s as part of a broad
tort reform initiative begun during the Republican administrations of
Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush. 4 A central argument is that
* Professor of Sociology and Criminal Justice, University of Delaware. Valerie
Hans dedicates this Article to the memory of her father, John Julius Hans, who
graduated from the University of Notre Dame in 1950 with a B.S. in Commerce. His

connection to Notre Dame was a source of pride and joy to him throughout his life.
t

Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Sociology and Criminal Justice, University of

Delaware.
I See Richard W. Stevenson, tPresident Asks Congress for Measures Against frivolous
Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2003, at A20.

2
3
4

Id.
1d.
See ELL[N E.

SWARD, THE DECLINE OF THE CIVILJURY

14-17 (2001); see also PRES-

IDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETIIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN AMERICA

(1991) (recommending changes to the civil justice system in response to the increasing problems of excessive costs and long delays in trials); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND POLICY
IMPLIcATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY

(Feb. 1986) (recommending changes to the civil justice system in response to
problems with insurance availability and cost).
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Americans have become increasingly litigious, an argument that is
now widely accepted among members of the public 5 and that President George W. Bush echoed in his most recent call for new limits on
civil justice and the jury." And juries, it is asserted, do not do a good
job in differentiating bogus and valid lawsuits. 7 Instead, they exacerbate the problem by their unwarranted sympathy for questionable
claimants and their concomitant delivery of excessive awards. 8
We can identify several distinct criticisms of the civil jury. First is
the broadly shared presumption that civil jurors are highly sympathetic to plaintiffs who bring lawsuits and tend to be hostile to corporate and insurance defendants? I A second charge is that civil jurors
have serious problems comprehending trial evidence and legal instructions, particularly in complex cases and trials with expert witnesses.' Compensatory awards by juries are subject to criticism as
well; they are seen as erratic and unpredictable, and usually too
high,1 1 although in some circumstances juries are accused of being
too stingy.12 Finally, the jury's involvement in punitive damages has
come under concerted attack.' Critics claim that juries determine
5 See VALERIE P. HANS, BUSINESS ON TRIAL: THE CIVIL JURY AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILrlY 58-67 (2000) (discussing the widespread public belief that America is
experiencing a litigation crisis and that there are many unjustified lawsuits).

6

See Richard A. Oppel, Jr., With a New Push, Bush EntersFray over Malpractice, N.Y.

TIMES, Jan. 17, 2003, at Al.
7 See generallyJEFFREY O'CONNELL & C. BRIAN KELLY, THE BLAME GAME: INJURIES,
INSURANCE, AND INJUSTICE 23-32 (1987) (asserting that juries are not competent to
evaluate evidence and testimony and are manipulated into verdicts by lawyer tactics).
8 See PETER W. HUBER, LIABII.TY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
50-51, 181-87 (1988); O'CONNELL & KELLY, supra note 7, at 23-32; WALTER OLSON,
THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WIiAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT

passim (1991). But seeHANS, supra note 5, at 52-58; Marc Galanter, Nevsfrom Nowhere:
The DebasedDebate on CivilJustice,71 DENV. U. L. REV. 77, 90-99 (1993) (refuting President Bush's statements that product liability litigation is hurting the American economy with empirical data showing that the number of product liability suits filed is
decreasing); Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV.
1093, 1103-09 (1996) (arguing that empirical data do not support the assertion that
Americans are increasingly litigious).
9 See HANS, supra note 5, at 12-14.

10 See Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American CivilJuiy: An Empirical Perspective, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 849, 853-75 (1999).
11 See EDIE GREENE & BRIAN H. BORNSTEIN, DETERMINING DAMAGES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JURY AWARDS 21-36 (2003).
12 See id.
13 See Brief of Certain Leading Business Corporations as Amici Curiae in Support
of Petitioner at 1-23, Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 981564, 2001
WL 1246676 (Utah Oct. 19, 2001), (addressing arguments related to ajury's involve-

ment in awarding punitive damages) rev'd, 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003).
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punitive damages in a capricious and arbitrary manner, thatjuries are
unable to translate their punishment desires into dollar figures consistently and fairly, and that juries consider legally inappropriate
14
factors.
Critics have proposed a variety of remedies to address the
problems they have noted with the civiljury.15 In addition to the Bush
administration's proposals for national limits on pain and suffering
and punitive damages, some commentators have suggested that civil
juries should be more tightly controlled in the types of evidence that
they may hear. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court's line of decisions
concerning expert testimony can be read as reflecting this perspective. 16 Critics favor greater use of carefully crafted interrogatories that
allow only specific factual questions to be answered by the jury rather
than allowing juries to reach general verdicts. 17 More drastic changes
include the idea that judges should take over the jury's role in deciding complex cases I8 and in assessing punitive damages.' 9 State legisla20
tures have implemented a number of these reforms.
In addition to changes that have or would limit the civil jury,
other proposed modifications are aimed at improving the representative nature and function of the jury. These include changing jury selection methods to achieve more representative juries, altering jury
structure to enable more efficient decisionmaking, and modifying
14
15

See Vidmar, supra note 10, at 849-50.
See infra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.

16 See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999); Gen. Elec. v.
Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579,
592-93 (1993). In these cases, the Court held that trial judges should serve as gatekeepers of expert testimony, making preliminary evaluations of the scientific basis of
expert testimony before allowing an expert to testify in the presence of the jury. A
key assumption is thatjurors might be overly influenced by scientifically questionable
expert testimony. See Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovich & Valerie P. Hans, Jurors' Evaluations of
Expert Testimony: Judging the Messenger and the Message, 28 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY (forthcoming 2003) (manuscript at 3, on file with authors); Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman
Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1124-25 (2001).
17 See Richard 0. Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Let's Not Rush to Judgment, 80 MICH. L. REV. 68 passim (1981).
18 See Lempert, supra note 17 passim.
19 See Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., No. 981564, 2001 WL 1246676,
at *6-18 (Utah Oct. 19, 2001), rev'd, 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003) (assessing the appropriate
role of the trial judge in upholding or denying a jury's punitive damages award to a

plaintiff); CASS R.

SUNSTEIN ET AL.,

PUNITIVE DAMAGES:

How

JURIES DECIDE

242,

248-49 (2002).

20 See THOMAS H. KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW 71-80
(2001) (surveying tort reform efforts in the states); Mark Ballard, Tort Reform Advances
in Mississippi (ForStarters), NAT'L L.J., Feb. 3, 2003, at Al (same).
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trial practices to promote jury competence. 2 1 Jury reform commissions have been active in a number of states. 22 Court administrators,
judges, lawyers, jury researchers, and jurors have recommended numerous changes to the jury system, both civil and criminal.2 3 Innovations have included allowing juries to take notes, to ask questions of
witnesses, and to discuss the evidence as it develops during the trial
24
with other jurors, rather than waiting until the final deliberation.
I.

EMPIRICAL RESEARCH AND THE FUNCTIONING OF THE CrVIL JURY

In the midst of this remarkable period of proposed and actual
reform of civil procedure relating to the jury, it is vital that we assess
both the validity of the complaints about the civil jury and the probable impact of civil jury reform. Are civil juries, as a general matter,
overly sympathetic to plaintiffs? Are they prejudiced against business
and insurance parties in litigation? Is jury incompetence a serious
problem, particularly in very complex trials with extensive expert evidence? Are jury awards erratic, excessive, and without legal merit?
And what are the probable effects of the many reforms of the civil
jury? Fortunately, a substantial amount of empirical research on the
civil jury's functioning has been conducted. We draw on that research
here to address the charges of civil jury bias and incompetence, and to
predict how civil procedure reforms will affect jury decisionmaking.
The contemporary field of empirical jury studies may be traced to
the 1950s and the groundbreaking work of the Chicago Jury Project,
21

See Stephan A. Salzburg, Improving the Quality ofjury Decision Making, in VER341 (Robert Litan ed., 1993).

DICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM

22

See, e.g.,

ARIZ. SuP. CT. COMM. ON MORE EFFECrixE USE OF JURIES, JURORS: THE
[hereinafter POWER OF TWELVE], available at http://www.

POWER OF TWELVE (1994)

(last visited Apr. 2, 2003); COUNCIL FOR CT.
2000 AND BFYOND: PROPOSALS TO IMPROVE THE JURY
D.C. (1998), available at http://www.courtexcellence.org/

supreme.state.az.us/jury/Jury/ury.htm
EXCELLENCE, JURIES FOR THE YEAR
SYSTEMS IN WASHINGTON,

pdf/Jury%20Reform/uries-summary.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2003); DEL. SUPER.
CT., REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE MORE EFFECTIVE USE OFJURIES (1998), available at http://www.dsba.org/tfrep.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2003); THE JURY PROJECT,
REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF

N.Y. (1994), available at http://www.

courts.state.ny.us/juryref~htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2003); Sup. CT. COMM. ON TIlE EFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT USE OF JURIES IN COLO., WrH RESPECT TO THE JURY: A PROPOSAL FORJURY REFORM (1997), available at http://www.courts.state.co.us/supct/commit

tees/juryreformdocs/uryref.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2003).

23 See, e.g., JURY TRIAL. INNOVATIONS passim (G. Thomas Munsterman et al. eds.,
1997) (compiling and describing various reform proposals).
24

See Valerie P. Hans, U.S. Jury Reform: The Active Jury and the Adversarial Ideal, 21

ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 85, 85-96 (2002).
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which focused primarily on criminal juries. 25 Most of the empirical
research on the civil jury has been conducted since the 1980s when
the tort reform movement highlighted questions about whether the
26
civil jury was competent and fair.
The empirical methods used to study the civil jury are diverse.
They include first and foremost systematic analyses of civil jury trial
outcomes. Scholars have examined whether trial outcomes have
changed over time and what case characteristics are associated with
verdicts and awards. 27 Jury verdict research firms have used lawyer
and court reports to collect case information and jury trial outcomes
in specific jurisdictions. Relying on verdicts or award data alone,
though, to make inferences about jury behavior can be misleading. 28
The inference problems are compounded when verdict research firms
selectively report verdict and award data.
Other social science methods have also been employed to study

thejury. Researchers have interviewed jurors after they have served to
ask them about the important evidence and other factors in their
cases. " 9 Interviews are an excellent way of obtaining jurors' perceptions of their cases, but they have some drawbacks. Memory problems
or desires to present oneself in a favorable light decrease the accuracy

of jurors' reports.""
25 HARRY KALVEN,JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966); see also Valerie P.
Hans & Neil Vidmar, The American Jury at Twenty-Five Years, 16 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY
323 (1991) (reviewing the Chicago Jury Project findings twenty-five years after the
initial publication of Kalven & Zeisel's study).
26 For examples of the studies done on civil juries, see STEPHEN DANIELS &JOANNE
MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM 60-183 (1995); NEAL FEIGENSON,
LEGAL BLAME: How JURORS THINK AND TALK ABOUT ACCIDENTS (2000); GREENE &
BORNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 175-99; SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 19, at 17-29 (2002);
VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM, supra note 21, at 137-285; and NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICANJURY: CONFRONTING THE M\-I-IS ABOUT
JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP POCKETS, AND OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS

(1995).

27 See DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 26, at 87-91; Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything About the Legal System? Win
Rates and RemovalJurisdiction,83 CORNELL L. REv. 581, 582-92 (1998); Brian J. Ostrom
et al., A Step Above Anecdote: A Profile of the Civil Jury in the 1990s, 79 JUDICATURE 233
passim (1996); Neil Vidmar, Pap and Circumstance:What Jury Verdict Statistics Can Tell Us
About Jury Behavior and the Tort System, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV'. 1205 passim (1994).
28 See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 27, at 582-92; see alsoVidmar, supra note
27, at 1211-24.
29

See Nicole L. Mott et al., Whats Half a Lung Worth? Civil jurors'Accountsof Their

Award Decision Making, 24 LAW & HUm. BEHAV. 401, 405-16 (2000) (reporting data
from interviews with civil jurors regarding the factors that were relevant to the jury in

setting an award); see also HANS, supra note 5, at 141-49.
30 HANS, supra note 5, at 20, 235 n.94.
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Several scholars have followed the early lead of Kalven and Zeisel
by conducting judge-jury agreement studies. 3 1 In these studies,judges
presiding over jury trials render hypothetical verdicts, the decisions
they would have reached had they been trying the case themselves, or
rate the extent to which the evidence favors one side or another.
These hypothetical judge verdicts or judicial assessments are compared to the actual decisions of the jury. This is an attractive method,
as it contrasts the jury's decision with that of a legal expert, but it has
been criticized on several grounds. It relies on judicial assessments to
make inferences about jury behavior, and it often assumes either implicitly or explicitly that the judge's verdict or assessment is the "right"
32

one.,

The most frequent method that jury researchers employ is the
mock jury experiment. In this approach, participants are asked to assume the role of jurors, to hear evidence in a case, and to decide
which side should prevail. A variable of interest, such as jury instructions, is randomly assigned to mock juries, so that some mock juries
have the instruction while others do not. The impact of the instruction is measured by comparing the judgments of the two sets of mock
juries. This method allows the researcher to draw causal inferences
about the impact of a particular variable, but there are questions
about how relevant the mock jury study results are to actual juries.
The validity ofjury simulation has been debated.3 The legal and
psychological sophistication of mock jury simulations varies tremendously, ranging from undergraduate students who read brief snippets
of testimony or summaries of a case and make individual judgments
on seven-point scales of evidence favorability, to full-scale mock trials
held in courtrooms with juries composed of people from the jury
rolls. In recent decades, developments in legal scholarship and various academic disciplines have fostered interdisciplinary and collaborative research. This climate has encouraged social scientists and legal
scholars to undertake more legally sophisticated jury research. Al31 See, e.g., GREENE & BORNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 63-66 (providing an overview
of various studies employing Kalven and Zeisel's method).
32 See Hans & Vidmar, supra note 25, at 335-36.
33 See Brian H. Bornstein, The Ecological Validity of Juy Simulations: Is the July Still
Out?, 23 LAw & HuM. BEiIAV. 75 (1999) (reviewing the previous twenty years of jury
simulation research); Shari Seidman Diamond, Illuminations and Shadows from Juy
Simulations, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 561 (1997) (discussing the problems with jury
simulation studies and how the problems affect the value of the research); Shari Seidman Diamond, Simulation: Does the Microscope Lens Distort?, 3 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. I
(1979) (providing an overview of the arguments for and against the value of jury
simulation research).
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are inthough unrealistic jury simulations are still published, there
34
creasing numbers of jury simulations of high verisimilitude.
Finally, there are a small number of field experiments on the civil
jury.3 5 In these studies, courts agree to randomly assign particular juries to the experimental condition, while otherjuries serve as controls.
These types of experiments have good potential for generalization as
they study the influence of a factor on actual juries deciding real
36
cases. However, they are very difficult and costly to carry out.

Many social scientists conclude that it is best to use multiple
methods to study the civil jury, as each methodological approach possesses inherent weaknesses and flaws. 3 7 Therefore, some research
projects have employed multiple methods to triangulate on the object
of their empirical study. It is a valuable approach for us as we consider what empirical research has discovered about the civil jury.
II.

THE DECLINE OF THE CmL JURY: AN EMPIRICAL PORTRAIT

The first important finding to note is that, at least at the federal
level where we have the most complete data, the civil jury trial rate has
been declining.3 8 Approximately 5000 civil jury trials are held in the
34 See Shari Seidman Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict Consequences: Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury, 26 LAw & Soc'Y RE\,. 513 (1992)
(analyzing the results of a jury simulation that studied the effect of expert witnesses,
deliberations, and jury blindfolding on damage awards); Irwin A. Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, An ExperimentalInvestigation of ProceduralIssues in Complex Tort Trials,
14 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 269 (1990) (describing the results ofjury simulation research
on the effect of trial structure and order and number of decisions on jury verdicts and
damage awards); Stephan Landsman et al., Be Careful What You Wish For: The ParadoxicalEffects of BifurcatingClaimsfor PunitiveDamages, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 297, 309-33 (evaluating the use of bifurcated trials through a jury simulation study).
35 See Shari Seidman Diamond et al., JurorDiscussions During Civil TriaLs: Studying
an Arizona Innovation, 45 ARIz. L. RE-'. 1 passim (2003) (reporting results from a field
study on the impact of jury discussions about evidence presented during the trial on
juror decisionmaking); Paula L. Hannaford et al., Permittingjury Discussions During
Trial: Impact of the Arizona Reforvn, 24 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 359 (2000) (describing a
field study on the impact ofjury discussions during trials on verdicts); Larry Heuer &
Steven Penrod, JurorNotetaking and QuestionAsking During Trials: A NationalField Experiment, 18 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 121 (1994) (reporting results of a field study on the
effect ofjury note taking and question asking during trials on jury satisfaction with the
trial and verdict).
36 See Valerie P. Hans, Inside the Black Box: Comment on Diamond and Vidmar, 87 VA.
L. REV. 1917, 1920-25 (2001).
37 See GREENE & BORNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 204-05.
38 See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realties, 88 CORNELL
L. REV. 119, 142-44 (2002); see also Patrick E. Higginbotham, So Why Do We Call Them
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federal courts each year. w Although civil case filings have increased
over the past thirty years, the proportion that is resolved through jury
trial has been decreasing. Judge Patrick Higginbotham reviewed Administrative Office data on civil filings in federal district courts from
1970 through 1999, and found that the number of civil cases rose by
152%, yet the number of cases that were tried by a judge or jury
dropped by 20%, so that, by 1999, the percentage of civil cases that
were resolved by trial was just 3%. 4 1 Interestingly, the judge trial rate
declined at a faster rate than the jury trial rate. 4 1 Another analysis of
Administrative Office data on federal civil trials found the same pattern of overall reductions in the civil trial rate and a sharper decline in

42
judge trials than in jury trials.

Data on jury trial rates over time in the state courts, where most
jury trials occur, are harder to come by, since states use diverse methods to record the activities of their trial courts. However, the National
Center for State Courts and the Bureau of Justice Statistics have recently collaborated in a national study of state courts of general jurisdiction in seventy-five of the most populous counties in the United
States. Samples of court data were collected in 1992 and 1996. 43 In
1992, juries decided an estimated 12,000 civil cases in these state
courts, and plaintiffs won 52% of these jury trials. 44 Four years later,
the win rate was 49%, and fewer jury trials were held-10,616, a drop
of over 10% although one that the study authors say is not statistically
significant. 4 5 In both years, over two-thirds of the trials held were jury
trials with the remainder bench trials. 46 A third round of data collec-

tion planned for the state courts will allow an assessment of whether
Trial Courts?, 55 SMU L.

REV.

1405, 1405 (2002); Mark Galanter, Remarks at AALS

Annual Meeting (Jan. 4, 2003) (transcript on file with author).
39
40

supra note 4, at 14.
Higginbotham, supra note 38, at 1408.
SWARD,

41 See id. at 1412-13 (Charts 7 and 8), 1421-22.
42 SWARD, supra note 4, at 12-14; Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 38, at 142-44
& n.127.
43

CAROLJ. DEFRANCES ET AL., CIVIL JURY CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES,

in BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., SPECIAL REPORT (July 1995) (reporting the 1992 data),
available at http://www.ojp.Llsdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cjcavilc.pdf (last visited Mar. 21,
2003); CAROLJ. DEFRANCES & MARIKA F.X. LITRAS, CIVIL TRIAL CASES AND VERDICTS IN
LARGE COUNTIES, 1996, in BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., BULLETIN (Sept. 1999) (reporting
the 1996 data), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ctcvlc96.pdf (last

visited Mar. 21, 2003).

44

DEFRANCES ET AL., supra note 43, at 1.

45

DEFRANCES & L.ITRAS, supra note 43, at 16.

46

Id. at 1.
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jury trials or the jury trial rate are increasing, decreasing, or staying
the same in the state courts.
As for the civil jury's business, the vast majority of civil jury trials
in state courts are tort cases, with smaller numbers of contract and
real property cases. 4 7 A substantial proportion of civil jury trials are
automobile personal injury cases. 48 The high profile cases such as
medical malpractice and products liability constitute only a small pro49
portion of the civil jury's caseload.
A number of theories about why civil jury trial rates are declining
have been advanced, including the expense of trial, the pressures to
settle cases, the push toward alternative dispute resolution, an increase in summary judgment, and cultural factors. 50 A desire to escape from the unpredictability and presumed biases of the jury has
also been asserted. 5' However, judge Higginbotham points out that
the more rapid decline of judge trials hints that other reasons are
more pertinent:
Commentators have suggested that the flight from the courthouse
is, in the main, a flight from the jury ....

The decline in trials has

not reflected the premise of a preference for a bench trial over a
jury trial.... [1]n a sense there is some vindication of the jury trial
52
but the overall picture of flight remains.
A portrait of the frequency and business of the civil jury begins to
emerge, then, from the empirical data. Although there is evidence of
declining use over time, particularly in the federal courts, juries decide a small but significant number of civil cases in federal and state
courts. Now that we have a picture of the work of the civil jury, let us
turn to the central claims about the civil jury's biases and competence
in determining verdicts and arriving at damage awards.

43, at 2.
supra note 43, at 1.
49 See id. at 2 (Table 1); DEFRANCES ET AL., supra note 43, at 2 (Table I).
50 See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don't Tiy: CivilJury Verdicts in a System
Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2-4 (1996) (arguing that American cultural
values favor settlements over trials); Judith Resnik, FailingFaith: Adjudicatory Procedure
in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494 passim (1986) (arguing that the Federal Rules of Civil
47

DEFRANCES ET AL., supra note

48

DEFRANCES & LITRAS,

Procedure have produced a decline in adjudication); see also Clermont & Eisenberg,
supra note 38, at 143 n.28; Higginbotham, supra note 38, at 1414-20.
51 Higginbotham, supra note 38, at 1421-22.
52 Id.
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EMPIRICAL., EVIDENCE ABOUT JuRY BIAs

A number of commentators assert that jury bias undermines the
soundness of civil jury decisionmaking. 5 Let us examine the empirical evidence. Mock jury research experiments point to the potential

impact of bias in that jurors' attitudes and personal experiences help
to shape perceptions of trial evidence and the narrative or story that
jurors develop as they listen to evidence and decide cases. 54 Evidence
that is inconsistent with jurors' prior views and attitudes may be dis55
counted or ignored, while consistent evidence may be emphasized.
Jurors' attitudes are usually more significant than demographic char56
acteristics in predicting verdicts.
Jurors' attitudes in civil jury decisionmaking could become increasingly significant due to recent, widely publicized corporate misbehavior by Enron, WorldCom, and other companies. In this light,
public opinion polls conducted by jury consulting firms and other
groups are disquieting. For instance, significant minorities of respondents in one poll said that they could not be impartial if asked to
decide cases with asbestos manufacturers, health maintenance organizations, or tobacco companies.5 7 Many respondents to a 2002 national poll reported negative assessments of corporate management. 5
The NationalLazwJournal, reporting on its top one hundred verdicts of
53
54

See infra notes 54-78 and accompanying text.
See FEIGENSON, supra note 26, at 171-210; REID

HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY

22-23 (1983) (describing the "story model" ofjuror decisionmaking); Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Some Steps Between Attitudes and Verdicts, in INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF JUROR DECISION MAKING 42, 47-48 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993).
55 See VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 120 (1986).
56 See Reid Hastie, Is Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire an Effective Procedurefor the Selection ofImpartialJuries?,40 Am.U. L. REV. 703, 711-12 (1991); Michael J. Saks, What Do
Jury Experiments Tell Us About How Juries (Should) Make Decisions?, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 1, 9-14 (1997).
57 Bob Van Voris, Voir Dire Tip: Pick FormerJuror,NAT'L L.J., Nov. 1, 1999, at A]
[hereinafter Van Voris, Voir Dire]. Fifteen percent said they could not be fair if a case
involved a tobacco company, 14% if a party were an asbestos manufacturer, and 12%
if a party were a health maintenance organization. Id. A year later, the numbers saying they could not be impartial increased: 34% for tobacco companies, 31% for asbestos manufacturers. Bob Van Voris, Jurors to Lawyers: Dare To Be Dull, NAT'L L.J., Oct.
23, 2000, at Al [hereinafter Van Voris, Jurors to Lawyers].
58 Tamara Loomis, Scandals Rock JurorAttitudes: Enron/WorldCom Ripple Seen Across
the Board, NAT'L L.J., OCT. 21, 2002, at A30. DecisionQuest (a jury consulting firm)
and the Minority Corporate Counsel Association undertook the national survey. Reportedly, "more than 80% of those polled agreed that 'the events of Enron and
WorldCom are just the tip of the iceberg.'' Id.
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2002, attributed at least some of them to 'juror rage" against corpo59
rate entities.
Although it is too soon to tell whether recent high profile corporate scandals have produced greater juror bias against corporate defendants in the courtroom, the common beliefs that jurors are highly
sympathetic to individual plaintiffs and anti-business are not supported by empirical evidence to date. 60
Hans's research program took a multi-pronged approach to examining the claims that civil juries are pro-plaintiff and anti-business,
61
combining several different research methods to assess the charges.
She interviewed civil jurors who had decided cases with business and
corporate litigants, conducted laboratory experiments varying
whether a defendant was a business corporation or an individual, and
did public opinion polling. Interviewing jurors about how they decided their cases, Hans found that instead of rampant pro-plaintiff
sympathy, many civil jurors were hostile to plaintiffs who brought civil
lawsuits. 62 They were not entirely hard-hearted; jurors were compassionate in a number of cases, especially when plaintiffs suffered severe
injuries. 63 However, on the whole, jurors voiced suspicions about the
plaintiffs in their cases, examined their claims critically, and looked
for ways that plaintiffs contributed to or might have fabricated their
own injuries.1 4 Jurors were deeply committed to an ethic of individual
responsibility, and many saw the fact of plaintiffs bringing lawsuits as
counter to that ethic. 65 Interestingly, they saw themselves as standing
66
guard against the potential of frivolous lawsuits.

These attitudes are very consistent with public opinion survey results showing that many Americans believe there are far too many frivolous lawsuits today, and that there is much meritless litigation. 67 In
the public view, jury awards are "out of control.

'68

59 Gary Young, Juy Room Rage, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 3, 2003, at C17 ("If punitive damages are a measure of juror anger, there were a lot of angry jurors last year.").
60 See HANS, supra note 5, at 138-77; VIIJMAR, supra note 26, at 191-202.
61 See HANS, supra note 5, at 138-77.
62 Id. at 36-39.
63 Id. at 30-31.
64 Id. at 36-49.
65 See id.
66 See id.
67 Id.; see also Edith Greene et al., Jurors' Attitudes About Civil Litigation and the Size
of Damage Awards, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 805, 806 (1991) (noting media attention and
reform efforts in the mid-1980s).
68 Van Voris, Jurors to Lazoyers, supra note 57; see also Valerie P. Hans & William S.
Lofquist, Perceptionsof CivilJustice:The Litigation CrisisAttitudes of CivilJurors, 12 BEHAV.
SCI. & L. 181, 181-82 (1994).
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Neal Feigenson and his colleagues have also discovered antiplaintiff bias in their simulation studies. They constructed mock juror
experimental materials so that in certain conditions the plaintiffs were
legally blameless .6 Even when the plaintiff was completely blameless
as a legal matter, some participants still held him accountable.7 1, For
example, in one scenario, a worker obeyed all the rules, and thus
would not have been legally accountable for his accident, but the
mock jurors attributed 22% of the responsibility for his accident to
him.7 1 In another scenario, the gas company installed a propane gas
tank with a faulty valve in a home. It malfunctioned, causing injuries.
The homeowner did not contribute to the accident in any way, yet
mock jurors judged the homeowner to be 14% responsible for the
injuries.

72

Ifjurors are not particularly pro-plaintiff in personal injury litigation, what about the other charge that jurors are prejudiced against
business defendants? Hans's research again used multiple methods to
attempt to identify anti-business prejudice. Public opinion polls generally produce ambivalent responses toward business, with strong support for capitalism and small business but some concerns about the
ethics of corporate executives and large businesses. 73 In interviews
with civil jurors, Hans found some occasional instances in which jurors made very harsh comments against corporate defendants, although they appeared to be more strongly linked to the trial evidence
about the behavior of the corporate defendants rather than pre-existing biases against business.7 4
She also used mock jury experiments to determine whether people responded differently when there was a corporate defendant as
opposed to an individual defendant in the case. 75 Other researchers
have taken a comparable approach. 76 These studies show marked dif69

See

FEIGENSON,

supra note 26, at 185-91; Neal Feigenson et al., Effect of Blame-

worthiness and Outcome Severity on Attributions of Responsibility and Damage Awards in Comparative Negligence Cases, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 597, 610-12 (1997); Douglas J.
Zickafoose & Brian H. Bornstein, Double Discounting: The Effects of Comparative Negligence on Mock JurorDecision Making, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 577, 579 (1999).

70 Feigenson et al., supra note 69, at 597-611.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 611.
73 See HANS, supra note 5, at 157-61; see also Loomis, supra note 58; Van Voris,
Jurors to Lawyers, supra note 57 (describing statistics showing that three-quarters of
potential jurors believe that corporate executives engage in unethical conduct).
74 HANS, supra note 5, at 157-61.
75

Id.

76

See, e.g., Robert MacCoun, Differential Treatment of CorporateDefendants by Juries:

An Examination of the "Deep Pockets" Hypothesis, 30 LAW & Soc'v

REV.

121 (1996) (report-
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ferences. For example, in a standard slip-and-fall case, mock jurors

were much more likely to attribute responsibility and liability to the
to a private
defendant when the fall occurred in a store as opposed
78
77
Awards were higher as well.
home during a tag sale.

The question is, why? If anti-business views are the reason, then
one would expect that attitudes toward business would be strongly related to the decisions these mock jurors reached. Yet, attitudes toward
business were weakly and inconsistently related to the case decisions;
and furthermore they were just as often a predictor of case outcome
in the individual as opposed to the corporate defendant cases. Thus,
although the research showed that people treated corporate litigants
differently from individual litigants, the reason they differentiated between them appeared to be due to higher expectations and more rigorous standards for corporate conduct rather than anti-business
sentiments.
IV.

EMPIRICAL, EVIDENCE ABOUT JURY FACTFINDING COMPETENCE

A number of reviews of empirical research have concluded that
the civil jury is generally competent as a factfinder. 79 Different strands
of empirical evidence point to the conclusion that most civil jury verdicts are sound. First, judge-jury agreement studies show substantial
rates of judicial agreement with jury verdicts. A substantial rate of judicial agreement with civil jury verdicts was first discovered in the
1950s in Kalven and Zeisel's Chicago Jury Project.8 0 Comparing the
judge's hypothetical verdict with the jury's actual decision in civil trials, they found thatjudge and jury agreed in 78% of the trials.8 1 Notably, their disagreements were largely symmetrical; judges would have
found for the defendant when juries reached a plaintiff verdict in 12%
of the trials, whereas judges would have found for the plaintiff when
the jury reached a defense verdict in 10% of the trials. 82 More recent
studies of civil jury verdicts also show substantial agreement rates. For
ing the results of research on the impact of the presence of a corporate defendant on
jury awards).
77 HANS, supra note 5, at 157-61.

78

Id.

79 See Richard Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Taking Stock After Twelve
Years, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM, supra note 21, at 181, 233-35;
Saks, supra note 56, at 13-14, 48-52; Vidmar, supra note 10, at 898-99. But see Petitioner's Brief at 23-25, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (No. 971709).
80 See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 25.
81 Id. at 63.
82 Id. at 64.
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instance, Diamond and others' videotape study of Arizona civil juries
found 77% agreement with the jury verdicts in forty-six cases in which
judges expressed an opinion. 8 3 A national study ofjuror question asking and note taking found 63% agreement with the jury verdicts in
sixty-seven civil jury trials.84 Importantly, the agreement rate was unaffected by the complexity of the trial. 85, The Hannaford and others'
study of Arizona civil juries found that overall, jury verdicts were in
line with judicial assessments of the evidence, and that the most powerful predictor ofjury verdicts was the judge's rating of the strength of
the evidence. 86 Again, trial complexity did not affect the agreement
rate. National surveys of judges find that as a group they voice strong
support for the civil jury, although they are willing to contemplate
reforms to improve the jury trial.8 7 Comparisons of jury verdicts to
the assessments of other experts such as claims adjusters have yielded
similar findings of substantial agreement. 88 Although there could be
a variety of reasons that juries might disagree with a judge's or other
expert's assessment of a case aside from incompetence, it is reassuring
that in the substantial majority of trials legal experts endorse the jury's
verdict.
The empirical evidence indicates agreement with jury verdicts in
most cases, but what about very complex civil trials? Cases of medical
malpractice, products liability, and toxic torts often include complicated expert testimony. As noted above, agreement rates in several
studies were unaffected by case complexity, suggesting that any difficulties that juries had with complex evidence and law were not major
contributors to unreasonable verdicts.
Other methodological approaches to the question also indicate
thatjuries can handle even very complex cases, although jurors report
that they are difficult. Neil Vidmar studied medical malpractice cases
to determine whetherjuries were able to reach rational decisions, analyzing court files and insurers' closed claim files, interviewing attorneys and jurors, and conducting experiments.8 9 He discovered that
jury verdicts were defensible and generally overlapped with medical
83
84

Diamond et al., supra note 35, at 67 n.108.
Heuer & Penrod, supra note 35, at 135 (Table 7).

85

Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Trial Complexity: A Field Investigation of Its Mean-

ing and Its Effects, 18 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 29, 49 (1994).
86
87

See Hannaford et al., supra note 35, at 374-75.
See Valerie P. Hans, Attitudes Toward the Civil Jury: A Crisis of Confidence?, in
VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVILJURY SYSTEM supra note 21, at 248, 261-65.
88 See Brief Amici Curiae of Neil Vidmar et al. at 9-10, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (No. 97-1709).
89 VIDMAR, supra note 26, at 49-175.
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experts' opinions, although jurors seemed to be more supportive of
doctors. 0 °

Several case studies of juries, using post-trial interviews, have
reached more critical conclusions about the civil jury's competence,
discovering instances in which jurors did not appear to understand
the significance of key expert testimony.9 1 Richard Lempert reviewed
thirteen very complex jury trials, the majority of which were civil trials,
concluding that most verdicts were defensible and observing that
"[e]ven when juries do not fully understand technical issues, they can
usually make enough sense of what is going on to deliberate rationally."9 2 Experimental studies likewise do not show a consistent pattern
93
of mock juries' inability to handle complex evidence.
Nonetheless, experimental research has identified some types of
evidence that can be particularly challenging to jurors. Statistical and
economic evidence, for example, is difficult to weigh and assess properly, although judges can be just as susceptible to these problems as
lay jurors.94 Another well-documented problem is with judicial instructions. Poorly written instructions delivered orally in court at the
end of ajury trial can prove to be challenging for laypersons to com95
prehend and apply.
Fortunately, a number of trial reforms such as pre-instructingjurors in the law, allowing note-taking, permitting jurors to ask questions of witnesses, letting jurors discuss the evidence during the trial,
and revising judges' instructions have been shown to promote better
comprehension and use of complex evidentiary and legal material. 96
90
91

Id. at 175-82.
See, e.g., MOLLY

SELVIN & LARRY

Picus,

THE DEBATE OVER JURY PERFORMANCE:

24-26 (1987);Joseph Sanders, Juy Deliberation in a Complex Case: Havner v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 16JusT. Svs.J. 45
passim (1993) (evaluating jury performance in the Havner case, involving complex
expert testimony).
92 Lempert, supra note 79, at 234.
OBSERVATIONS FROM A RECENT ASBESTOS CASE

93 See Brief Amici Curiae of Neil Vidmar et al. at 14-19, Knmho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (No. 97-1709).

94
95

Id.
SeeJURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS, supra note 23, at 18-20; PETER M. TIERSMA, LEGAL
LANGUAGE 231-40 (1999).
96 See POWER OF TWELVE, supra note 22; B. Michael Dann, "LearningLessons" and
"Speaking Rights": Creating Educated and Democratic Juries, 68 IND. L.J. 1229, 1247-71
(1993) (evaluating and advocating for jury reforms that promote greater juror participation in the trial); Lynne FosterLee & Irwin A. Horowitz, The Effects ofJury-Aid Innovations on JurorPerformance in Complex Civil Trials, 86 JUDICATURE 184, 186-88 (2003)
(providing the results of mock jury research demonstrating the positive effects of

note-taking and better jury instructions on juror deliberations); Hans, supra note 24,
at 89-97 (2002) (describing and advocating for reforms that promote more active ju-
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JuRy DAMAGE AwARDs IN CIVIL TRIALS: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

V.

Jury damage awards have also been the subject of empirical
study.97 Here the need for systematic empirical information is especially critical, because news publications tend to publish only the most
extreme jury damage awards. Perhaps the most famous jury damage
award came in the McDonald's coffee case, in which Stella Liebeck
received third degree burns from the spill.98 McDonald's had received over 700 complaints over a ten-year period regarding the coffee

temperature and coffee burns, yet never consulted a burn specialist.99
The plaintiff was awarded $160,000 in compensatory damages and
$2.7 million in punitive damages.10 0 The case is well known, yet its
extraordinary coverage may have provided the public with a misleading picture of the frequency and size of the typical damage award. 10 1
The same goes for the National LawJournalspractice of reporting the
one hundred largest verdicts of the year; this can tend to obscure the
overall picture of jury awards in more typical cases.' 0 2 Professor Theodore Eisenberg observes that focusing on the biggest verdicts of the
13
year may provide an erroneous impression of typical jury behavior.'
ries); Heuer & Penrod, supra note 35 passim (reporting results of a field study refuting
arguments that juror note-taking distracts jurors and promotes biases in juror decisionmaking); Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Some Suggestionsfor the CriticalAppraisalof
a More ActiveJury, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 226 passim (1990) (advocating for a greater use of
juror note-taking and question-asking); William W. Schwarzer, Reforming Jury Trials,
1990 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 119, 128-32, 138-43 (evaluating the benefits of jury instructions and juror discussions about evidence); Robin C. Larner, Annotation, Jurors Questioning Witnesses in Federal Court, 80 A.L.R. FED. 892, 894-96 (1994) (reviewing cases
where judges found that juror question asking did not result in biased juror deliberations); see

alsoJUDICIAL MGMT. COUNCIL, FINAL REPORT OF THEJURY INNOVATIONS COM-

(2001), available at http://www.flcourts.org/osca/divisions/committee/bin/
finalreportl.pdf (suggesting that Florida reform its court procedures to include juror
questions, discussions of evidence, note-taking, and improved jury instructions); Ellen
Chilton & Patricia Henley, Jury Instructions: HelpingJurorsUnderstand the Evidence and
the Law, at http://www.uchastings.edu/plri/spr96tex/uryinst.html (last visited Apr.
3, 2003) (discussing the value of jury question-asking, juror discussions about evidence, and jury instructions to decisionmaking).
97 See, e.g., GREENE & BORNSTEIN, supra note 11 (recent review and summary of
empirical research).
98 See Liebeck v. McDonald's Rest. P.T.S., Inc., No. CV-93-02419, 1995 WL 360309
(D.N.M. Aug. 18, 1994); Michael McCann et al., Javafive: Genealogy of a Judicial Icon,
MITEE

56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 113, 120 (2001).

99
100
101
102
2003,
103

See McCann et al., supra note 98, at 124-25.
Liebeck, 1995 WL 360309, at *1.
McCann et al., supra note 98, at 114.
See David Hechler, NLJ Verdicts 100: Billions and Billions, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 3,
at Cl.
Young, supra note 59.
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Therefore it is worthwhile to review the available empirical data
on damage awards. We return to the National Center for State
Courts/Bureau of Justice Statistics project for information about jury
damage awards in seventy-five large urban courts.1 4 In the 1992 sample, jury trials with plaintiff winners had a median total award of
$52,000 (including both compensatory and any punitive damages)
and a mean of $455,000. 1115 Typical awards varied by the type of case,
with lower awards characteristic of the very frequent automobile cases
(median of $29,000) and higher awards more typical in medical malpractice (median of $201,000) and product liability (median of
$260,000) trials. 1116 There were similar findings in the 1996 sample; in
1996 jury trials with plaintiff verdicts, the median total jury award was
$35,000.107 Medical malpractice, product liability, and employment
discrimination cases had the highest median awards,10 8 and automobile cases the lowest at $18,000.109 Although median awards were
lower in 1996 than 1992, there was a greater proportion of awards
over one million dollars in 1996 (7% of the jury trials with plaintiff
winners)'"" compared to 1992 (4%).111 Thus, the typical award in
state jury trials is modest, but there has been an increase in large
awards in specific types of cases. Some analyses relying on data from
july verdict reporters show an increase injury damage awards over the
last several decades in some jurisdictions.' 12 One must caution that
verdict reporters are not fully representative and that changes over
time may reflect changes in the behavior of the parties such as settlement practices as well as differences in jury valuation and verdicts.' 13
Other approaches have been taken to examine the reasonableness of jury awards, including examining the correlation between
award size and the plaintiffs' reported severity of injury.' 1 4 These
studies show that injury size and award amount are positively related,
104
105

See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
DEFRANCES ET AL., supra note 43, at 5 (Table 6).

106

Id.

107

DEFRANCES

108

& LITRAS, supra note 43, at 1.
Id. at 7 (Table 6) (showing that the median award for medical malpractice

cases was $286,000, for employment discrimination cases was $200,000, and for products liability cases was $1,593,000).

109
110

Id.

111

DEFRANCES ET AL., sup/ra

112

ERIK

Id. at 8 (Table 7).

K.

note 43, at 5.

MOLLER, EXPLAINING VARIATION IN PERSONAL INJURY JURY AWARDS

56-58, 103 (1997).

113

Id. at 28, 103.

114

See Vidmar, supra note 10, at 879-81, for a summary of these studies.
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except that death produces a lower award than very serious injury."15
There is also a substantial amount of variability within levels of injury,
which may reflect actual differences in plaintiffs' injuries from case to
case as well as differences attributable to jury evaluations.
Some studies have contrasted how jurors, or mock jurors, compare to other decisionmakers in awards. In one such comparative
study, Vidmar and Rice presented a case in which a female patient
suffered a severely burned knee and considerable pain and suffering,
and they asked participants to render a compensatory damage
award.' 16 Vidmar and Rice found nearly equivalent median and mean
17
damage awards between jurors and practicing senior lawyers.'
One finding from the state court data is that jury trials in which a
corporation is the defendant have higher average damage awards
than cases with individual defendants.' 18 This may be due, at least in
part, to the fact that different types of cases are brought against individuals and corporations. However, critics have also asserted that juries operate with a deep-pockets approach, and consider the
defendant's financial resources in arriving at their damage awards.' 19
There is plausibility in this assertion, but thus far it has not been supported by experimental tests that have attempted to separate corporate identity from financial resources. In Hans's mock jury research
comparing corporate versus individual defendants, she found consistently higher awards in cases with corporate parties. 12°1 But when she
tested the deep-pockets hypothesis more directly, by varying the stated
financial resources of the defendant, there were no differences in recommended awards. 2 1 Similarly, Robert MacCoun gave personal injury cases descriptions to mock juror participants, varying whether the
defendant in each one was described as a rich individual, a poor individual, or a corporation. 122 People's judgments did not differentiate
between wealthy and poor defendants, another blow to the deep-pock115 Id.
116 Neil Vidmar &Jeffrey R. Rice, Assessments of Noneconomic DamageAwards in Medical Negligence: A Comparison of Jurors with Legal Professionals, 78 IOWA L. REv. 883, 891

(1993).
117

Id. at 892-95.

118 DEFRANCES
43, at 6-7.

ET AL.,

supra note 43, at 6; see also DEFRANCES & LITRAS, supra note

119 See Neil Vidmar, Empirical Evidence on the Deep Pockets Hypothesis:JuryAwards for
Pain and Suffering in Medical Malpractice Cases, 43 DUKE L.J. 217 passim (1993) (analyzing the assertion thatjuries award huge damages when they believe the defendant has

an ability to pay large sums).
120 Id.
121 HANS, supra note 5, at 178-214.
122

MacCoun, supra note 76, at 121.
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ets hypothesis. 123 In another mock jury study, Vidmar asked jurors to
award compensatory damages. 124 In one of the scenarios, jurors were
told that the cause of injury was automobile negligence, while for
other scenarios it entailed medical malpractice.1 2 5 Whether the defendant was an individual (e.g., driver or doctor) or a corporation
(e.g., the driver's company or a hospital) was also varied. 126 No statistically significant differences between jurors awarding damages to individuals or corporations were found. 127 Finally, a mock jury
experiment of a complex product liability case also varied the net
worth of a company as either $11 million or $611 million, but those
who learned about the higher net worth did not reach higher com28
pensatory damage awards.'
VI.

JURY COMPETENCE IN PUNITIVE DAMAGES: EMPIRICAL. EVIDENCE

Unlike compensatory damages, which are awarded to compensate for the plaintiffs pain and suffering, lost wages, and medical expenses, punitive damages are awarded to punish the defendant and to
29
deter the defendant and others from harmful behavior.'
Some critics have claimed that punitive damage verdicts are soaring out of control.' 1° In state courts, the collaborative research of the
Bureau of Justice Statistics and the National Center for State Courts
shows that punitive damages are typically awarded in a minute portion
of all civil jury trials, and they are rarely awarded in the high profile
cases such as medical malpractice and products liability.:" In 1992,
punitive damages were awarded in 6% of the jury trials in which plaintiffs prevailed, with a median of $50,000.132 They were more frequent
in contract cases, where 12% of plaintiff winners were awarded punitive damages, than in tort cases, in which 4% of the plaintiff winners
got punitive damages.'13 There was a clear pattern of frequency of
punitive damages by type of case: slander and libel (30% of the plaintiff winners received punitive damages), employment disputes (27%),
123 Id.
124 Vidmar, supra note 119, at 241-55.
125 Id. at 244-46.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 256-58.
128 Landsman et al., supra note 34, at 312 n.59.
129 Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Christina A. Studebaker, Anchoring in the Courtroom:
The Effects of Caps on Punitive Damages, 23 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 353, 353 (1999).
130 See Vidmar, supra note 10, at 849.
131 DEFRANCES ET AL., sup)ra note 43, at 8 (Table 8).
132 Id. at 6; id. at 8 (Table 8).
133

Id. at 8 (Table 8).
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fraud (21%), and intentional torts (19%) being the most frequent
case categories for punitive damages.' 13 4 Medical malpractice cases
only rarely result in a punitive damages award. For instance, of the
403 medical malpractice cases during 1992 with a plaintiff winner, just
thirteen cases resulted in punitive damages. 3 5 In fact, after reviewing
hundreds of medical malpractice cases over three decades, Rustad
and Koenig concluded, "punitive damages were awarded in only the
l3
most egregious cases involving healthcare practitioners."'
In 1996, the National Center for State Courts/Bureau of Justice
Statistics project found that punitive damages were awarded to about
5% of plaintiffs who won their trials,13 7 with a median punitive damage awarded by juries of $50,000.1 18 Thus, the empirical data from
large urban state courts are fairly consistent in showing that punitive
damages are awarded rarely, and are concentrated in certain types of
cases such as intentional torts.
Despite the rarity of punitive damages, an intense debate over
punitive damage awards in civil trials has erupted over the last several
years. Skeptics claim that juries determine punitive damages in a capricious and arbitrary manner, that juries consider legally inappropriate factors, and that there is too much variability and unpredictability
injuries' punitive damage awards. 3- The critics argue that because of
the many failings of the civil jury in their damage assessments, judges
rather than juries should decide punitive damages.' 40 Judges are
more experienced in assessing liability and determining appropriate
punishment.' 4' Alternatively, some have argued for limits, or a cap,
42
on the amount that can be awarded.'
134 Id. at 6; id. at 8 (Table 8).
135 Id. at 1.
136 Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, ReconceptualizingPunitive Damages in Medical
Malpractice: Targeting Amoral Corporations, Not "Moral Monsters", 47 RUTGERS L. REV.
975, 1027 (1995); see also id. at 985-91 (discussing the history and empirical reality of
punitive awards in medical malpractice cases).
137 D.PFRANCES & LrTRAS, supra note 43, at 9 (Table 8).
138 Id. at 10 (Table 9).

139

See Brief of Certain Leading Business Corporations as Amici Curiae in Support

of Petitioner at 1-23, Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 981564, 2001
WL 1246676 (Utah Oct. 19, 2001), rev'd, 123 S.Ct. 1513 (2003).
140 Id. at 22; FRANKLIN STRIER, RECONSTRUCTING JUSTcE: AN AGENDA FOR TRAL
REFORM 283-85 (1994); Lisa M. Sharkey, Comment, Judge orJury: Who Should Assess
PunitiveDamages?,64 U. CIN. L. REV. 1089, 1127-40 (1996).

141

SUNS'TEIN ET AL.,

supra note 19, at 186-207; Sharkey, supra note 140, at 1089.

142 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Punitive Awards After BMW, A
New Capping System, and the Reported Opinion Bias, 1998 Wis. L. REv'. 387, 388-89. But
see Sandra N. Hurd & Frances E. Zollers, State Punitive Damages Statutes: A Proposed
Alternative, 20J. LEGIS. 191, 192 (1994) (finding that persons who engaged in outra-
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THE QUESTION OF JURY COMPETENCE IN
ASSESSING PUNITIvE DAMAGES

A major program to assess jury competence in punitive damages
decisionmaking was funded by the Exxon Corporation in the wake of
the Exxon Valdez oil spill and subsequent jury trial, which involved
punitive damages. 43 The program of research included a series of
mock juror and mock jury studies in which participants determined
the appropriateness and amount of punitive damages either individually or in groups. 144 In one key study, mock jurors were presented
with summaries of case facts, in addition to instructions concerning
punitive damages.1 45 In each of these cases, either the trial judge or
an appellate judge had ruled that punitive damages were not justified
as a legal matter, although that was not communicated to the study
participants. 46 Jurors were instructed that a compensatory damage
award had already been reached, and were asked to determine if punitive damages were "proper," providing the case facts.' 4 7 The researchers stated, "Most of the mock juries decided that the consideration of
punitive damages was warranted, although appellate and trial judges
had concluded that they were not warranted."'14 Other studies found
mock juries wanting in their ability to translate consistently and reliably their sense of disapproval of the defendant's behavior into dollar
values, and in understanding and applying judicial instructions regarding punitive damages. 49 A book summarizing the research program concluded thatjurors perform unreasonably in punitive damage
decisionmaking, and thatjudges should be more aggressive in managing jury punitive damage awards. 150 The studies also urge serious consideration of moving away from juries and toward damages schedules
15 1
and civil fines.
geous civil misconduct should be required to pay for actual damages as well as damages sufficient to punish their conduct to deter them and others in the future).
143 In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-0095-CV, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12952, at *19 (D.
Alaska Jan. 27, 1995); SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 19 passim (collecting the empirical
studies funded by Exxon, which were initially published in a variety of scholarly journals and law reviews).
144 SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 19, at 4-5, 17-26.
145 Reid Hastie et al., A Study of Juror and Jury Judgments in Civil Cases: Deciding
Liability for Punitive Damages, 22 LAw & HUM. BEHAN,. 287, 290-92 (1998).
146 Id. at 290-91.
147 Id. at 289.

148

Id. at 287.

149
150
151

See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 19, at 31-42, 223-27.
See id. at 242-43.
See id. at 248-55.
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This empirical program of research on punitive damages has provided some important insights into how lay people approach the issue.
The findings that mock jurors have difficulty with legal instructions
about punitive damages is quite consistent with research showing similar problems with other types of legal instructions. 152 However, a
number of scholars have raised compelling criticisms of the punitive
damages research, particularly its applicability to actual cases. It contradicts statistical analyses of punitive damages showing that they have
been appropriately awarded. 5 3 Another criticism is that the mock
jury research on punitive damages determination does not mimic conditions under which real juries operate.1 54 Within the study, mock
jurors were asked to make judgments concerning law. Yet with true
juries, this decision is left entirely to thejudge.1 55 These mock jurors
were asked to render a legal decision, rather than one based upon
fact.' 5 6 Another concern with this study entails the summaries provided to mock jurors. Scenarios provided to jurors comprised only
1000 to 1500 words, and videotaped evidence presented to jurors, including the judge's instructions on the law, ranged from eleven to
fifteen minutes.'

15 7

Professor Richard Lempert reviewed the mock jury punitive damages research, finding many flaws that compromised its external validity.' 58 Lempert concluded that this study:
tells us almost nothing about the likely magnitude of inappropriate
hindsight effects on punitive damage verdicts. The study's external
validity is sufficiently low, given the many differences between the
152 See TIERSMA, supra note 95, at 231-40 (providing an overview of the findings
from research on jury instructions).
153 Brief Amici Curiae of Certain Leading Social Scientists and Legal Scholars in
Support of Respondents at 6-7, Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No.
981564, 2001 WL 1246676 (Utah Oct. 19, 2001), revt, 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003) [hereinafter Brief of Certain Leading Scholars]; Richard Lempert, Juries, Hindsight, and Punitive Damage Awards: Failuresof a Social Science Case for Change, 48 DEPAUL L. RE'. 867,
876 (1999); Neil Vidmar, Juries Don't Make Legal Decisions! And Other Problems: A Critique of 1lastie et al. on Punitive Damages, 23 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 705 (1999). In response to Vidmar's piece, see Pheobe C. Ellsworth, Sticks and Stones, 23 LAW & HuM.
BEFIAV. 719 (1999); Reid Hastie et al., Reply to Vidmar, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 715
(1999); Robert J. MacCoun, Epistemological Dilemmas in the Assessment of Legal Decision
Making, 23 LAW & Hum. BEFIIAV. 723 (1999); and Richard L. Wiener, Point and Counterpoint: A Discussion ofJury Research in the Civil Arena, 23 LAW & HuM. BEHiAV. 703 (1999).
154 See Vidmar, supra note 153, at 709.
155 Id.
156 Brief of Certain Leading Scholars, supra note 153, 21-27; Vidmar, supra note
153, at 705-13.
157 SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 19, at 43-46.
158 Lempert, supra note 153 passim.
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experimental conditions and the situations of actual juries, that gen15 9
eralizing from the study's results to actual juries would be risky.'
Professor Jennifer Robbennolt reviewed the available empirical
research on punitive damages by juries and concluded,
the research examining the processes by which jurors determine punitive damages suggests that jurors take into account important
characteristics of the cases in making their punitive awards ...
UJiurors do not appear to make decisions that clearly differ from
the decisions that judges would make, certainly not to the dramatic
60
extent that most critics of the jury would suggest.'
We would urge that researchers explore other methodological
approaches in punitive damages research, including highly realistic
simulations and juror interviews, to better assess how real juries decide
real punitive damages.
VIII.

EMPIRICAL. EVIDENCE ABOUT IMPACT OF CAPS OR LIMITS ON

COMPENSATORY AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES

President George W. Bush's recent call for limits or caps on jury
awards at the federal level has been preceded at the state level by a
substantial amount of legislative action.' 6 1 Caps on damage awards,
primarily limits on pain and suffering awards and punitive damages,
are intended to control the maximum amount awarded by juries. To
date, over forty states have instituted limits on the amount of damage

awards. i62
There are many criticisms of award limits, and in some states the
legislation has been found unconstitutional. 163 One criticism of im159 Id. at 876.
160 Jennifer K. Robbennolt, DeterminingPunitiveDamages: EmpiricalInsights and Implicationsfor Reform, 50 BUFF. L. REv. 103, 158 (2002).
161 Oppel, supra note 6.
162 For a summary of legislative actions, see SWARD, supra note 4, at 302-05; and
Jacqueline Perczek, Note, On Efficiency, Punishment, Deterrence, and Fairness:A Survey of

Punitive Damages Law and a Proposed Juy Instruction, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 825,
878-904 (1993). Examples of caps legislation may be found in ALA. CODE § 6-11-21
(1993); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73 (West 1997);
and NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 42.005 (Michie 2002). See also Ballard, supra note 20
(describing recent tort reforms, including limitations on jury compensatory and punitive damage awards, in Mississippi).
163 See David A. Saichek, Putting the Lid on Caps, Wis. LAW., Dec. 1996, at 5 (noting
that, as of December 1996, caps on non-economic damages had been struck down in
Oregon and Washington, and caps in medical malpractice cases had been found unconstitutional in Alabama, Kansas, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, and Texas);
Martha Middleton, A Changing Landscape: As Congress Struggles To Rerite the Nation's
Tort Laws, the States Already May Have Done theJob, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1995, at 56, 59 (pro-
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posing a limit in all civil trials in cap states is that they do not provide
the ability to fully reflect the severity of the defendant's conduct. 164
Defendants who have behaved egregiously and caused harm to one or
more plaintiffs may get a "free pass" for their behavior, it is argued.'65
Placing caps on awards could discriminate against those plaintiffs who
are unable to demonstrate a significant amount of actual harm.'

6

Limits may also serve the deterrent purpose of punitive damage
awards. 16 7 Others have claimed that limitations on awards can frustrate the jury's efforts to determine appropriate punishment and
deterrence.16

8

One would predict that the institution of such caps would have a
dramatic effect on overall damage award amounts, and very importantly, on insurance rates. For example, a study conducted by the
Rand Institute for Civil Justice estimated caps on punitive damages in
financial injury cases would result in a reduction in damage awards by
approximately 65%.169 Recently, doctors have responded to spikes in
their malpractice premiums by withholding medical services and holding highly publicized walk-outs, hoping to influence state legislators to
impose limits on jury awards, which in turn they predict will decrease
their malpractice premiums.' 71 Perhaps surprisingly, then, statistical
studies to date show mixed evidence that caps are having these in-

viding a chart of the tort reform legislation passed by the states). For a discussion of
the constitutional issues at stake in tort reform proposals, see Robert S. Peck et al.,
Tort Reform 1999: A Building Without a Foundation, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 397, 416-20

(2000).
164 Thomas M. Melsheimer & Steven H. Stodghill, Due Process and Punitive Damages: ProvidingMeaningful Guidance to the Jury, 47 SMU L. REV. 329, 346-48 (1994).
165 Id. at 347.
166 Id.
167 d. at 348.
168 Id.; see also Perczek, supra note 162, at 865.
169 ERIK MOLLER ET AL., RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVII..JUSTICE, PUNrrivE DAMAGES IN
FINANCIAL INIURY.JURY VERDICTS 44 (1997).

170

Neil Vidmar and Leigh Ann Brown argue that analysis of the problem of medi-

cal malpractice premium increases is incomplete, tending to focus on the tort system

and ignoring the insurance business cycle and other causes of insurance rate increases. Neil Vidmar & Leigh Ann Brown, Tort Reform and the Medical Liability Insurance Crisis in Mississippi:Diagnosingthe Disease and Prescribinga Remedy, 28 Miss. C. L.
REV.

(forthcoming 2003) (manuscript at 4-11, on file with author).
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tended effects. 171 Some states have experienced decreases, while
172
others have not.

Empirical research using jury simulation methodology suggests
one possible reason why caps may be not be as surefire a method for
award reduction as they may seem. Robbennolt and Studebaker
found an anchoring effect with the punitive damage cap.' 73 In their
study, undergraduate students read a brief vignette describing a scenario in which the plaintiff contracted human immunodeficiency virus
(HIV) following a blood transfusion as a result of a vehicular accident. 174 Researchers manipulated both the punitive damage cap level
($100,000, $5 million, and $50 million) and the manner in which the
cap was presented (restrictive or permissive). 175 The restrictive
method informed participants they were not permitted to award more
than the amount of the assigned cap, while permissive instructions
informed jurors they could award up to the amount of the cap. 176 A
control condition was also incorporated in which no punitive damage
limits were present. Results indicated that as the cap level increased,
77
the size and variability of the punitive damage award also increased.1
According to these authors,
while the cap was successful at limiting the size and variability of
punitive damage awards when the cap was low or moderate, when
the cap on punitive damages was relatively high, participants made
larger and more variable punitive damage awards than did those in
the control group in which no limit was imposed. Thus, the high
cap anchored punitive damage awards to the extent that the cap
pulled punitive damage awards higher than they otherwise would
have been.

178

171 See Oppel, supra note 6; see also GREENE & BORNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 179.
Compare Patricia M. Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims:
New Evidence, 49 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57, 76-78 (1986) (finding caps reduced
plaintiff recovery), with William P. Gronfein & Eleanor DeArman Kinney, Controlling
Large Malpractice Claims: The Unexpected Impact of Damage Caps, 16J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y

& L. 441, 447-48 (1991) (noting that Indiana claim payment amounts are higher
than those in neighboring states).
172 See GREENE & BORNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 179; compare Danzon, supra note
171, at 76-78 (finding caps reduce plaintiff recovery), with Gronfein & Kinney, supra
note 171, at 447-48 (noting that Indiana claim payments have increased since the
state imposed caps on damages).

173
174
175
176
177
178

Robbennolt & Studebaker, supra note 129, at 361.
Id. at 357-58.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 361.
Id.
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Although the applicability of this jury simulation to actual jury
decisionmaking remains to be demonstrated, it suggests that even
though caps are intended to restrict overall damage amounts, this
approach to guiding the jury may have some unintended
consequences. 179
CONCLUSION

In sum, this review of empirical evidence about the functioning
of the civil jury indicates that the problems with the civil jury are overstated. Civil jury verdicts appear to be sound; civil jury verdicts are
generally in line with the weight of the evidence, and there is a high
rate of agreement with legal experts such as trial judges. The claim
that juries are uniformly pro-plaintiff cannot be supported. Although
jurors can be sympathetic, there is a countervailing tendency to question plaintiffs' claims in civil litigation. As for the charge that business
corporations are treated with hostility, we observe that corporate behavior is judged by more exacting standards, but to the extent that we
can tell, it seems to be linked to a higher standard for corporate action than individual action, derived from the greater resources and
potential impact of corporations. Whether this will hold true in a
post-Enron world remains to be seen.
With respect to civil jury awards, media coverage and advertising
campaigns have led to a gross overestimation of the typical jury
award. 18 ' Manyjury awards appear to be appropriate and equitable in
that cases with more serious injuries generally result in higher awards.
However, there is also empirical evidence of what Professor Michael
Saks calls horizontal inequity, where similar injuries are treated differently. 8 The proposed remedy of capping pain and suffering awards
and punitive damage awards appears to have inconsistent impact in
both the research laboratory with mock juries and in the real world
laboratory of state tort reform.
We see a continuing need for empirical research on the civil jury.
Additional empirical research is required to examine different methods of promoting greater equity in jury awards and to explore the
effects of recently enacted tort reforms. States can function as a natural laboratory for assessing the effects of caps and other civil jury reforms, although as we have seen the complexities of determining the
179 Michael J. Saks et al., Reducing Variability in CivilJury Trials, 21 LAW & HUM.
BEIIAV. 243, 245-46 (1997) (noting that caps may enhance windfalls to the slightly
injured while depriving those most seriously injured).
180 See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
181 See Saks et al., supra note 179, at 253-55.
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effects on jury behavior can be challenging. Finally, we would encourage judges and lawyers to take full advantage of innovative trial
practice reforms, such as revising instructions, allowing note-taking,
question-asking, and trial discussions, which can enhance the civil
jury's decisionmaking ability.

1524

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

78:5

